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I. CONTEXT AND PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY 
The state youth corrections facilities, known as the California Youth 
Authority (CYA), were once regarded as the pinnacle of enlightened juvenile 
 
* Barry Krisberg is a Senior Fellow at the University of California Berkeley Law School. He led an 
investigation of the CYA for the California Attorney General and has been the Court Expert on Safety and 
Welfare issues in the Farrell Consent Decree since 2005.  
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justice practice in the decades of the 1960s and 1970s.1 International travelers and 
practitioners from many U.S. jurisdictions conducted site visits and attempted to 
adopt many California policies and practices. The CYA was particularly prized 
for its innovations in offender classification, therapeutic innovations, and its 
commitment to the use of community-based corrections programs. While all was 
not perfect in the CYA, its operations were superior to those in most other states.2 
In the 1980s, the political environment changed and became focused on 
increasing punishment to deter juvenile offenders.3 The CYA budget for 
treatment and rehabilitation was reduced, and there was a deliberate effort to 
make the conditions of confinement harsher.4 Also, cutbacks in community 
alternatives led to a large increase in the confined population in the CYA. By 
1996, the population of CYA facilities exceeded 10,000 youths.5 Lengths of stay 
for incarcerated youth were also increasing and a larger proportion of parole 
violators were sent back to CYA facilities. Governor Schwarzenegger merged the 
CYA under the umbrella of the state prison system, renaming it the Division of 
Juvenile Facilities.6 
For nearly 20 years, the CYA, now renamed as the Division of Juvenile 
Justice (DJJ), experienced a steady decline in its treatment and rehabilitation 
programs and a serious deterioration in how its youth were cared for and 
managed. In the first decade of the 21st century, there were a series of suicides in 
DJJ facilities and well-publicized media accounts of severe crowding, high levels 
of violence, extensive use of solitary confinement, and practices of holding some 
youth in cages not fit for zoo animals as part of their education programs.7 A 
video that allegedly showed several DJJ employees beating a young resident was 
 
1. Throughout this paper we will refer to the California Youth Authority (CYA) and the Division of 
Juvenile Justice (DJJ). These different names refer to the same state agency at various points in time. Also, the 
name of the consent decree changed over time to recognize the new directors of DJJ as the defendant. 
Originally it was referred to as Farrell v. Harper, and today it is known as Farrell v. Beard. 
2. BARRY KRISBERG, JUVENILE JUSTICE: REDEEMING OUR CHILDREN at ix (2005). 
3. See, e.g., Barry Krisberg, The Politics of Juvenile Justice: Then and Now, 15 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
893, 901 (1990) (stating that the 1980s had “aggressive policies”); KRISBERG, supra note 2, at 58 (stating that 
into the 1980s “a conservative reform agenda dominated” and it “emphasized deterrence and punishment as the 
major goals of the juvenile court”). 
4.  See KRISBERG, supra note 2, at 58 (stating that under a conservative agenda some states introduced 
mandatory minimums); BARRY KRISBERG ET AL., BERKELEY CTR. FOR CRIM. JUST., A NEW ERA IN 
CALIFORNIA JUVENILE JUSTICE: DOWNSIZING THE STATE YOUTH CORRECTIONS SYSTEM at 5 (Oct. 2010), 
available at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/A_New_Era_10-22-2010.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (stating that as costs continued to rise, but state grants were not, alternatives such as sending youth to 
state prison became cheaper). 
5. KRISBERG et al., supra note 4, at 1. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 14. 
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published on the Internet and made almost all the national television network 
news outlets.8 
Recidivism rates for youth leaving DJJ facilities were among the worst in the 
nation. Some in the legislature called for the abolition of the DJJ or at least a halt 
to new admissions.9 In 2003, the Prison Law Office and the prestigious corporate 
law firm of Latham Watkins filed class action lawsuits against the DJJ.10 
California Attorney General Bill Lockyer and the then CYA ordered an 
exhaustive investigation led by a panel of juvenile justice experts.11 This 2003 
review found that the DJJ was violating many state and federal laws and 
engaging in serious violations of the U.S. Constitution.12 Based on these findings, 
Governor Schwarzenegger agreed in 2004 to settle a lawsuit that is today known 
as Farrell v. Beard.13 The resulting consent decree is one of the most far-reaching 
remedial plans in American juvenile justice history.14 
This is when the downward spiral of California youth facilities began to 
slowly change. The Legislature appropriated a significant amount of funding to 
remedy some of the critical staffing shortages and several new laws were enacted 
to limit the types of youth who could be sent to the DJJ.15 New leadership was 
recruited to lead the reforms. 
As of July 2014, the DJJ has met virtually all of the requirements and the 
outside monitors have agreed that the DJJ is in substantial compliance with issues 
in the areas of safety and welfare of youth, health and dental care, education, 
 
8. Id. at 13–15. 
9. Id. at 1–2 (illustrating that lawmakers were reacting to high recidivism rates, so “legislators enacted 
comprehensive reforms to ‘realign’ the juvenile justice system”). 
10. See Complaint at 1, 40, Farrell v. Harper, No. RG 03079344 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Cnty. Jan. 6, 
2003), available at http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/cyastate.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(filing a complaint against Jerry Harper, the Director of the California Youth Authority).  
11. Barry Krisberg, Reforming the California Division of Juvenile Justice: What’s the End Game, 25 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 281 (2012) [hereinafter End Game].  
12. The complete set of reports that were filed by the experts is available via the Prison Law Office at 
www.prisonlaw.com. 
13. Consent Decree at 1, Farrell v. Allen, No. RG 03079344 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Cnty. July 28, 
2004), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/juvenile_justice/docs/ConsentDecree.pdf [hereinafter Consent 
Decree] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also Major Cases & Achievements, PRISONLAW.COM, 
http://www.prisonlaw.com/ cases.php (last visited Feb. 20, 2015) (stating that under Farrell v. Harper, now 
known as Farrell v. Beard, CYA officials signed a consent decree). 
14. Consent Decree at 1, Farrell v. Allen, No. RG 03079344 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Cnty. July 28, 
2004), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/juvenile_justice/docs/ConsentDecree.pdf [hereinafter Consent 
Decree] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also Major Cases & Achievements, PRISONLAW.COM, 
http://www.prisonlaw.com/ cases.php (last visited Feb. 20, 2015) (stating that under Farrell v. Harper, now 
known as Farrell v. Beard, CYA officials signed a consent decree). 
15. Sue Burrell, The Legislature’s Role in Juvenile Justice Reform: A California Example, NCCD BLOG, 
(Apr. 7, 2014), http://nccdglobal.org/blog/the-legislature-s-role-in-juvenile-justice-reform-a-california-example 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
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disability rights, and effective programs for sex offenders.16 While not completed, 
the DJJ has made major improvements in mental health diagnoses and treatment. 
It is expected that these areas will be completed within the next eighteen months. 
Even more remarkably, the DJJ population fell below 680 youth in 2013.17 
The legislature enacted several laws that encourage counties to hold non-violent, 
non-sex offenders in local programs.18 Parole violators, once about half of the 
CYA institutional population, are now also managed at the county level. 
Localities receive approximately $120 million annually to provide services for 
these youth.19 The DJJ closed eight institutions and five camp programs. This 
decarceration effort is the largest one ever in the history of the juvenile justice 
system.20 And, despite predictions of “doom and gloom” by many law 
enforcement officials, the juvenile and young adult arrest rate has continued to 
decline and there is no evidence that more young people are being sent to adult 
prisons or jails, or being housed in county detention centers due to decarceration 
at state youth facilities.21 
The goal of this Article is to understand the key elements of this remarkable 
success story. The story is not well known outside the DJJ and the people 
involved in the Farrell consent decree. Lessons learned are highly relevant to the 
future of other juvenile corrections systems and for adult corrections as well. 
While not perfect, the current DJJ is one of the most progressive juvenile 
corrections systems in the nation. The DJJ today offers many very valuable 
policies and processes that could well benefit other jurisdictions. This Article 
attempts to understand the people and the methods that produced this 
extraordinary step forward in the enlightened treatment of troubled and 
troublesome young people. 
 
16. See Twenty-Ninth Report of the Special Master at 26, Farrell v. Beard (No. RG 03079344) (Cal. 
Super. Ct., Alameda Cnty. July 28, 2014), available at http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/OSM29.pdf [hereinafter 
Twenty-Ninth Report] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that defendant is to be congratulated). 
17. See id. at 2. 
18. See e.g. S.B. 459, 2003 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003) (stating that facilities must regularly report back 
to counties on the status of youth); S.B. 81, 2007 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007) (stating that “the bill would 
require the county to apply to the Corrections Standards Authority for approval of a county institution”); A.B. 
1628, 2010 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010) (stating that “[b]y imposing additional duties on counties, this bill 
would create a state-mandated local program”). 
19. See A.B. 1913, 2000 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) (stating that the act increases the amount of 
Supplemental Law Enforcement Services Fund to 243,350,000 annually, half of which is to be allocated to 
implement juvenile justice plans). 
20. See Krisberg et al., supra note 4, at 1. 
21. Id.  
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II. STUDY METHODS 
To complete this study I reviewed the original CYA consent decree materials 
as well as the remedial plans submitted by the DJJ. I had access to all of the 
compliance reports developed by the various experts that were appointed by the 
court pursuant to the Farrell consent decree. These generally included 
comprehensive summaries that each of the experts produced at year end for the 
period 2009–2013. Most important, I could rely on excellent reports on the 
progress of the remedial plans that were submitted by the Office of the Special 
Master (OSM). I had in depth discussions with the Special Master Nancy 
Campbell and the Deputy Special Master John Chen. 22 
I conducted far-ranging interviews with the principal plaintiffs’ attorneys 
Donald Specter and Sara Norman of the Prison Law Office and with Van 
Kamberian, who represented the defendants in the Farrell case. 
I developed a very brief questionnaire about the reform process and 
conducted thirty to forty-five minute phone interviews with many of the Court 
experts and with virtually every DJJ manager who worked on the Farrell 
remedial plans. I was able to have detailed conversations with the 
superintendents of all the remaining DJJ facilities. I asked each of these 
knowledgeable interviewees to reflect on the largest challenges faced by DJJ and 
their view of major accomplishments. I asked interviewees to discuss their 
perspectives on the “unfinished agenda” of reform and the keys to successes. We 
also discussed remedial strategies that did not yield the expected positive results. 
Each of the interviewees was asked to identify other people to be 
interviewed. In all, I talked with over fifty DJJ and Farrell case insiders. I also 
reached out to a number of outside youth advocates who had closely followed the 
DJJ reforms. While I have tried to faithfully reflect these staff, advocates’ and 
management perspectives, I assume the ultimate responsibility for all of the 
observations and opinions in this report. 
While I briefly examined the dynamics of reform in each of the remedial 
areas, I focused primarily of the major elements of the safety and welfare plan, 
with which I had direct familiarity. 
In the course of my several site visits to DJJ institutions, I conducted over 
one hundred interviews with youth residents and staff. These interviews were 
conducted under strict requirements of confidentiality and privacy. These first-
hand viewpoints were partially summarized in prior reports written for the 
court.23 
 
22. All of these materials are available from the Prison Law Office at www.prisonlaw.com or the 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation at www.cdcr.ca.gov. 
23. Barry Krisberg, The Long and Winding Road: Juvenile Corrections Reform in California, CHIEF J. 
EARL WARREN INST. OF L. & SOC. POL’Y (May 2011), available at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/ 
Long_and_Winding_Road_Publication-final.pdf [hereinafter The Long and Winding Road] (on file with the 
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I had total access to DJJ data on incident reports, youth grievances and use-
of-force (UOF) reviews. Each month I participated in a multi-disciplinary staff 
task force that reviewed a cross section of UOF reports, including staff behavior 
reports about youth, and the case plans and case notes on individual youth. The 
DJJ allowed me complete access to any information that I requested and 
respected my request to preserve the confidentiality of the youthful residents. I 
visited the DJJ facilities many times over the past ten years and have enjoyed 
open access to all living units and staff in DJJ. 
To place these observations within a broader policy context, I reviewed 
excellent case studies that were conducted in other state juvenile facilities in 
Arizona, Massachusetts, Missouri and New York. These were all states that made 
major strides in correcting legal deficiencies and implementing evidence-based 
policies and practices.24 The findings of these case studies will be compared with 
the DJJ findings. 
III. WHAT WERE THE MOST DIFFICULT CHALLENGES FACING DJJ? 
In 2004, state facilities faced significant crowding. Even as the population 
declined from its peak of over 10,000 youth residents in the late 1990s, many 
living units were still jammed with often more than sixty-five to seventy young 
people in a unit.25 Custody staffing levels were inefficient and the personnel to 
deliver core services were inadequate. Further, the CDCR possessed byzantine 
and time-consuming policies to evaluate and sanction staff engaging in serious 
misconduct. Abuses in worker’s compensation and leave practices reduced the 
actual number of staff that showed up at work to supervise the youth. 
Crowding was exacerbated by the closures of some DJJ facilities due to the 
crumbling infrastructure and the expense of fixing the electrical, sewage, and 
plumbing systems in these older facilities. Other facilities were shut down for a 
variety of reasons, including media accounts of abusive practices and riots and 
fires that destroyed several older living units. There were consistent budget 
 
McGeorge Law Review); End Game, supra note 11, at 281–85; Barry Krisberg, Farrell vs. Beard: Final 
Comprehensive Report on Safety and Welfare, CHIEF J. EARL WARREN INST. OF L. & SOC. POL’Y (2013) 
[hereinafter Farrell vs. Beard: Final Comprehensive Report] (expressing, at various points, the viewpoints of 
DJJ staff and residents). 
24. See ALEXANDRA COX, JUVENILE FACILITY STAFF RESPONSES TO ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE (2013); 
SCOTT H. DECKER ET AL., A CASE STUDY OF THE RESPONSE OF THE ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE 
CORRECTIONS TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT CONSENT DECREE (2011); 
RICHARD A. MENDEL, THE MISSOURI MODEL: REINVENTING THE PRACTICE OF REHABILITATING YOUTHFUL 
OFFENDERS (2010). 
25. See LIZZIE BUCHEN, CTR. ON JUV. & CRIM. JUST., CALIFORNIA’S DIVISION OF JUVENILE FACILITIES: 
NINE YEARS AFTER FARRELL (Apr. 2013), available at http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/state_of_ 
djf.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that one of the top priorities of the remedial plan is 
smaller living units of sixteen to twenty-five youth). 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 46 
781 
pressures by the Department of Finance and the Legislature to reduce the costs of 
the system. Within a few years the DJJ closed eight major institutions and five 
camp programs. Despite CDCR plans to “re-purpose” these closed institutions, 
most have remained shuttered or were torn down. Budget cutbacks led to the 
closure of many vocational and educational programs. Even recreation offerings 
were shrunk. Medical, dental and mental health services were not well funded 
and reentry or parole resources were disappearing. Staff morale was very poor. 
Annual costs per youth had risen seven-fold in the early 2000s due to new 
union contracts that included significant salary and benefit increases.26 There 
were also added overhead costs created by the oversight of CDCR. The 
substantially enhanced health care, education, and treatment services that were 
mandated by the legal challenges pushed up the costs of DJJ operations.27 As the 
resident population declined, DJJ was unable to shrink its headquarters staffing 
and costs to match the smaller system. All of these factors made the per-youth 
costs climb. 
For several years, DJJ staff had embraced the professional orientation of 
adult corrections officers. To justify increasing pay for its members to the level 
of state police officers, the DJJ union leaders asserted that youth facilities were as 
dangerous as state prisons and constituted “the toughest beat in the state.” 28 The 
conventional corrections mentality was to confront, contain, and punish 
misconduct by the young residents. While there were many staff interested in 
delivering rehabilitation programming, these employees were not supported by 
management for many years. In almost all aspects of DJJ daily activities, security 
and custody were the overriding considerations. DJJ lacked written policies in 
many crucial areas, leaving staff to make snap judgments on how to handle many 
complex and threatening situations. The Division was operated with very 
informal management methods. Programs and services were not routinely 
monitored or evaluated by DJJ leaders. Anecdotes, not reliable information, 
drove facility and headquarters decision-making. 
There was a major problem of violence in DJJ facilities. Frequent fights, staff 
assaults, facility lockdowns, and group disturbances became the daily norm. Fear 
of out-of-control violence led staff to rely excessively on mechanical and 
chemical restraints to control the perceived chaos in the living units. The use of 
solitary confinement and locking youth in their cells twenty-three hours a day 
grew.29 As noted earlier, there was a rash of attempted and completed suicides. 
 
26. See  KRISBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 11. 
27. See id. (stating that the “Farrell consent decree has required hiring more medical, mental health, and 
education staff for CYA facilities and this has led to cost increases”). 
28. JOSHUA PAGE, THE TOUGHEST BEAT: POLITICS, PUNISHMENT, AND THE PRISON OFFICERS UNION IN 
CALIFORNIA (2011); see The Long and Winding Road, supra note 23 (stating that “a very strong union of 
corrections workers increased its power”). 
29. KRISBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 12. 
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The totality of the facts listed above eroded support for the DJJ among 
juvenile justice professionals, youth advocates, elected officials, the media, and 
the public at large. There were questions about how long the state should 
continue to operate corrections programs for youthful offenders. The largest 
challenge faced by DJJ managers was to somehow restore confidence that the 
organization could operate in a professional and effective manner. The steady 
barrage of criticism of the DJJ in a variety of public forums created bitterness and 
a sense of impending loss of jobs among virtually all DJJ direct-care staff and 
managers. Over the many years of steady decline, the DJJ suffered from 
inconsistent and ever changing leadership. Since 1980, there had been more than 
twenty directors and acting directors of the agency and several of these political 
appointments lacked apparent qualifications and training to run a major youth 
corrections agency.30 In an era dominated by the rhetoric of “getting tough on 
crime,” governors generally preferred candidates with law enforcement 
backgrounds and histories of political party loyalty.31 
Another dilemma was that the DJJ became more and more isolated from 
juvenile justice professionals at the county level and with those from other states. 
DJJ managers stopped attending national conferences of juvenile justice 
professionals. The internationally renowned CYA research division was gutted.32 
Very little research and evaluation was being conducted, and the DJJ was not 
especially welcoming to university-based researchers. DJJ leaders were not 
exposed to the emerging research on evidence-based programming. Moreover, 
there was great resistance in the agency to learning about alternative approaches 
that were being implemented in states such as Missouri, Oregon, Colorado or 
Washington.33 
 
30. See The Long and Winding Road, supra note 23 (stating that “the CYA had a procession of 
directors”); History of the DJJ, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Juvenile_Justice/DJJ_ 
History/Index.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2015) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (listing 10 named 
directors since 1980). 
31. See The Long and Winding Road, supra note 23 (stating that “directors . . . were often retired law 
enforcement officials or strictly political cronies”). 
32. See KRISBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 1. 
33. See generally RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., THE MISSOURI METHOD: 
REINVENTING THE PRACTICE OF REHABILITATING YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS 2 (2010) (looking at Missouri’s 
practices); ELIZABETH SEIGLE, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, MEASURING YOUTH OUTCOMES IN JUVENILE 
JUSTICE: THE LEADERSHIP OF OREGON YOUTH AUTHORITY (Mar. 19, 2014), available at http://csgjustice 
center.org/youth/posts/measuring-youth-outcomes-in-juvenile-justice-the-leadership-of-oregon-youth-authority/ 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (examining those in Oregon); JUST. POL’Y INST., THE COSTS OF 
CONFINEMENT: WHY GOOD JUVENILE JUSTICE POLICIES MAKE GOOD FISCAL SENSE 12–13 (2009) (explaining 
the results of Washington’s practices); Jordan Steffen, Population Dropping in Colorado Youth Corrections 
Facilities, DENVER POST (Mar. 3, 2013), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_22706558/population-dropping-
colorado-youth-corrections-facilities (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining the results of 
Colorado’s methods). 
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IV. SIGNIFICANT REFORM ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
The DJJ has met or exceeded the mandated reforms that were listed in the 
Farrell consent decree in most areas involving dental and medical health care, sex 
offender treatment programs, and general and special education issues.34 There is 
substantial compliance with the dictates of the remedial plans in the areas of the 
care of disabled youth and in most of the safety and welfare issues.35 There are 
only a few outstanding matters in these last two remedial areas that are being 
monitored by the OSM. 
Reforms in the Mental Health domain were the last to really get going at DJJ, 
but the court expert Bruce Gage has noted that substantial progress is being made 
and that DJJ is almost halfway to full compliance with the required mental health 
remedial tasks.36 
Most dramatically, the youth population of the DJJ has been reduced by over 
90% from when the initial Farrell case was filed.37 Today there are less than 700 
youth confined in DJJ’s three institutions and one camp program.38 This number 
includes about 140 youngsters who were sentenced as adults and may be 
transferred to CDCR when they become eighteen years old.39 
As noted earlier, many obsolete DJJ facilities have been closed and the 
remaining living units are all well below the Farrell goals of thirty-two youth in a 
living unit and sixteen youth per wing. While staffing at headquarters and some 
facility administrative staff have been modestly reduced, the ratio of direct-care 
staff to youth is quite impressive. Staffing ratios have also been improved for 
teachers, health care professionals, and mental health professionals. 
Many of these reductions in the youth population and staffing enhancements 
were produced via legislative actions and consistent support of DJJ budget 
requests from the Governor’s office and the Senate and Assembly Budget 
Committees.40 
 
34. See The Long and Winding Road, supra note 23. 
35. See id. 
36. See, e.g., Bruce Gage, Mental Health Audit Comprehensive Summary 1, in Twenty-Ninth Report of 
the Special Master, Farrell v. Beard, No. RG 03079344 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Cnty. July 28, 2014), 
available at http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/OSM29.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
37. Barry Krisberg, California’s Youth Prisons Nearing an End, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 1, 2012), 
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/California-s-youth-prisons-nearing-an-end-2888214.php 
[hereinafter California’s Youth Prisons Nearing an End] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
38. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., DIV. OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, POPULATION OVERVIEW 1 (2014), 
available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/docs/research/Population_Overview/POPOVER2014. 
pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).  
39. Id.  
40. See, e.g., California’s Youth Prisons Nearing an End, supra note 37 (noting one such population-
decreasing legislative initiative); Commonweal California Budget Bulletin (Jan. 15, 2013), available at 
www.comjj.org/wp.../10/FY13-14CAbudget-JuvJusticeFundStatus1.doc (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (noting a granting of funds in support of DJJ’s goals). 
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A. Reducing Policies and Practices Harming Youth 
As noted earlier, the alleviation of crowding and the implementation of more 
appropriate staffing levels produced a significant decline in violent incidents in 
terms of youth-on-youth assaults, staff assaults, and group disturbances. 
Reducing violence and fear at DJJ facilities is at the core of the Farrell remedial 
plans. These drops in violence were most pronounced at the O.H. Close Youth 
Correctional Facility (OHCYCF) but also were observed at the N.A. Chaderjian 
Youth Correctional Facility (NACYCF).41 Violence reductions took longer to 
manifest at the Ventura Youth Correctional Facility (VYCF), which was the most 
troubled of all the DJJ facilities for the past several years.42 But in the first half of 
2014, VYCF recorded lower levels of violence than in previous periods.43 And it 
appears that more improvements could be expected in the near future.44 
Reductions in youth violence were also accompanied by a number of very 
positive outcomes. The frequency of  UOF incidents went down significantly at 
OHCYCF and NACYCF.45 There was also progress on this issue at the VYCF.46 
For example, the rate of UOF incidents at Ventura dropped from a high of .73 per 
100 days of youth confinement in May 2013 to .48 per 100 days of youth 
confinement in May of 2014.47 
DJJ developed a set of comprehensive policies designed to limit the UOF and 
to encourage staff to deescalate the response to youth behavior. Direct-line staff 
received increased training in conflict resolution and safe intervention 
approaches. The use of chemical restraints has not been completely eliminated, 
but its use is way down in mental health units and cases involving single youth 
that do not involve assaults of other youth or staff. 
DJJ developed a regular format by which each facility reviews its major UOF 
incidents on a monthly basis. These reviews are conducted by a multidisciplinary 
team at the facility and cover topics such as staff compliance with formal 
policies, the completeness and accuracy of UOF incident reporting, and whether 
there may have been more appropriate responses to the circumstances that led to 
 
41. Twentieth Report of the Special Master at 17–18, Farrell v. Cate, No. RG 03079344 (Cal. Super. Ct., 
Alameda Cnty. Jan. 5, 2012), available at http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/OSM20Full.pdf [hereinafter 
Twentieth Report] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
42. Id. at 15. 
43. Farrell vs. Beard: Final Comprehensive Report, supra note 23, at 14. 
44. Detailed evidence for much of what is reported in this section can be found in Farrell vs. Beard: 
Final Comprehensive Report, supra note 23, and Twenty-Ninth Report of the Special Master, Farrell v. Beard, 
No. RG 03079344 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Cnty. July 28, 2014), available at http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/ 
OSM29.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
45. Farrell vs. Beard: Final Comprehensive Report, supra note 23, at 13.  
46. Id.  
47. Twenty-Ninth Report .  
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the UOF.48 Where indicated, these reviews lead to internal investigations and/or 
mandated additional training and close supervision for the involved staff. 
Security managers are required to examine whether the UOF was the least 
amount required to protect the safety and security of the youth and staff.49 The 
review must consider the disability status of the youth and if the ADA 
requirements were followed.50 The timeliness and adequacy of the medical staff’s 
response to UOF events is also evaluated.51 
At DJJ Headquarters, an interdisciplinary team of managers, the Deputy 
OSM and the Court expert on safety and welfare convene monthly to examine a 
sample of the UOF cases at every facility. This headquarters team assesses the 
adequacy of the facility-level review process and makes recommendations for 
further actions as required. The headquarters team, chaired by the Deputy 
Director of DJJ, produces a memorandum to each facility on needed corrective 
actions.52 Also examined are case notes produced after the event to provide 
greater insight into causes of UOF incidents and guidance on how to prevent 
reoccurrences of these events in the future. 
The UOF review process evolved from the recommendations of a staff and 
management task force designed to reduce UOF, especially for youth with 
disabilities. That task force reviewed scores of UOF reports and found that past 
practices were inadequate. The new guidelines to review UOF were vetted by the 
OSM, the Court experts for safety and welfare and mental health and the 
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ attorneys.53 The resulting UOF scrutiny is 
comprehensive and thorough. Few if any juvenile corrections systems across the 
Nation have a comparable UOF review process. No such careful UOF 
examinations are routine in most California county facilities. One exception is 
Los Angeles County, which was subject to a major U.S. DOJ lawsuit.54 
 
48. CHRISOTPHER MURRAY ET AL., CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., DIV. OF JUVENILE JUST., SAFETY 
AND WELFARE REMEDIAL PLAN: IMPLEMENTING REFORM IN CALIFORNIA 25–26 (2006), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/juvenile_justice/ docs/safetywelfareplan.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
49. Id. at 25. 
50. See CTR. ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUST., FARRELL SPECIAL MASTER COMPLIANCE TABLE 2 (July 
2011), available at http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/18th_special_master_report.pdf [hereinafter 
FARRELL SPECIAL MASTER COMPLIANCE TABLE] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
51. See, e.g., FARRELL MEDICAL EXPERTS, SECOND REPORT OF CONSENT DECREE BASED ON SITE VISITS 
5 (2011), available at http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/OSM9AppC.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review). 
52. See, e.g., FARRELL SPECIAL MASTER COMPLIANCE TABLE, supra note 50. 
53. See CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., DIV. OF JUVENILE JUST., INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR 
USE OF FORCE POLICY 5, available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Regulations/Juvenile_Justice/docs/Initial 
StatementOfReasons.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).  
54. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES REGARDING THE LOS ANGELES PROBATION CAMPS 5, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/lacamps_moa.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
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There have been significant reductions in the reliance on solitary 
confinement in the DJJ since 2005.55 The older and discredited policy and 
practice of confining youth in a lockup unit for twenty-three hours a day with 
minimal services is gone. In its place, the DJJ has developed a range of options 
that constitute a short-term limitation on the program of youth who are in some 
kind of crisis and who may be a danger to themselves or others.56 These 
alternatives include a very short-term “cool down period” in the youngster’s 
room (or in a separate room in those few remaining dormitory units). Another 
option for staff is to utilize “room confinement” in which the youth stays in his 
own room, usually for less than a day. Youth needing more specialized attention 
are managed in the Treatment Intervention Program (TIP), which is designed to 
last only a few days. 
Data on TIP for June 2014 revealed that more than half of the youngsters 
assigned to this program were returned to regular programs within one day and 
only 18% were in TIP for more than three days.57 Most important, the TIP 
program includes educational services and mental health services and is designed 
to return youth back to their regular programs as soon as possible. The goal of 
TIP is not punishment, but closely monitored separation for a very short duration 
to assist the youth to return to a more appropriate program placement and 
treatment services. These limited program options permitted the DJJ to eliminate 
temporary detention that had been a regular feature of past DJJ practice. Further, 
these programs rely on delivery of counseling and mental health interventions, 
not deprivation of basic services. Youth in TIP generally spend a large number of 
waking hours out of their rooms and engaged in education, recreation, and other 
positive activities.58 This approach is consistent with the best professional 
thinking and the growing literature on the harm to adolescents of extreme 
isolation.59 
The most restrictive level of limited programming is the Behavioral 
Treatment Program (BTP). These youth have engaged in repeated and very 
serious disciplinary infractions. The BTP had sixty-five youngsters assigned to it 
in June 2014. The twenty-two youth in the OHCYCF BTP stayed an average of 
thirty-seven days. At NACYCF there were fifteen residents of the BTP, who 
stayed an average of 106 days, and at VYCF there were twenty-eight youth, who 
 
55. But see, e.g., Ryan Gabrielson, Juvenile Inmates Often Isolated Nearly 24 Hours Straight, CAL. 
WATCH (June 13, 2011), http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/juvenile-inmates-often-isolated-nearly-24-hours-
straight-10757 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
56. See Twenty-Fourth Report of the Special Master app. B, at 6, Farrell v. Cate, No. RG 03079344 (Cal. 
Super. Ct., Alameda Cnty. Jan. 3, 2013), available at http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/OSM24.pdf (on file with 
the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining the use of such alternatives at OHCYCF). 
57. See Twenty-Ninth Report, supra note 16, at 52.. 
58. See PAUL DEMURO, TOWARD ABOLISHING THE USE OF DISCIPLINARY ISOLATION IN JUVENILE 
JUSTICE INSTITUTIONS: SOME INITIAL IDEAS (REVISED) 2 (Jan. 22, 2014). 
59. Id.  
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stayed an average of 106 days. These average lengths-of-stay figures are greatly 
affected by a very small number of young people who might remain in the BTP 
for a very long period. More typical BTP assignments are for less than two 
months. 
Before the Farrell reforms took hold, the DJJ lockup units had as many as 
400 youth on any given day and the length of stay was at least 270 days. In the 
“bad old days,” the lockup units included a wide range of youth who had 
engaged in serious assaults, defied staff orders, evidenced severe mental health 
issues, or were in the lockup unit in protective custody. The BTP is now almost 
reserved exclusively for very assaultive young people, and the DJJ uses its other 
programming options for young people who may need temporary separation from 
their regular living units. 
Youth in the BTPs spend most of their waking hours outside their rooms, 
receiving a full range of education and treatment services. The BTP staff assist 
youth to gradually reenter their regular housing units through a phased process of 
helping the youth increase their personal skills to manage and defuse potentially 
violent situations. 
The BTPs are still evolving as a program model. In the early days of the 
BTPs, these units closely resembled the old lock up units, with extensive and 
routine use by staff of mechanical and chemical restraints. As staff on the BTP 
units received more training and coaching in the new model, the conditions and 
treatment of young people in the BTPs markedly improved. 
DJJ introduced more services, counseling, and groups in the BTP units that 
focused on cognitive behavioral skills, anger management, and preparation for 
community reentry. Staff assigned to the BTPs have embraced the new 
philosophy of increasing mental health services, improving youth communication 
and conflict resolution skills, and providing opportunities for vocational and 
educational achievements. 
Idleness was a big issue at the DJJ in the early days of the Farrell case. 
Youth spent many hours in their rooms or in living unit day rooms. School was 
often cancelled due to lack of teaching staff. Vocational programs and post-
secondary classes, once a strong point in CYA facilities, had all but disappeared. 
Recreational programming was minimal and art and music offerings had all but 
disappeared. Religious services were under-staffed and underfunded. Library 
resources were poorly organized and not very accessible to the youth. Almost all 
the young people wanted work assignments, but unemployment in the DJJ was 
epidemic and chronic. 
The Farrell experts believed that idleness was a major contributor to 
violence and other serious misbehavior among DJJ residents.60 DJJ staff also 
clamored for more activities to keep the young people positively engaged and 
 
60. See, e.g., Twentieth supra note 41, at 22. 
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motivated to succeed. One important component that cut across most of the 
Farrell remedial plans was to establish a target of the number of waking hours 
that youth would be expected to be involved in positive, pro-social activities. 
Next, it was vital to develop a Program Service Day (PSD) for each living unit 
that would organize the various services, allowing education, counseling, groups, 
recreation, and health care staff to get work assignments completed. Staff 
struggled over the reconciliation of the different work schedules of differing 
kinds of DJJ personnel. Management decided to assert the primacy of education 
services, but insisted that adequate time be devoted to other youth needs.61 It took 
some time to develop the Program Service Days and train staff on the necessity 
of actually following the schedules. The DJJ was also able to make use of a 
newly completed automated information system to ensure that the PSD 
guidelines were being followed or that impediments to offering the PSD were 
identified and removed. The PSD was commenced on a pilot basis, but it was 
eventually adapted and expanded to all DJJ living units. Staff and youth 
expressed strong support for the predictability and daily structure that resulted 
from the PSD. 
The implementation of the PSD was indicative of a decisive move by DJJ 
managers to upgrade and improve virtually all of the agencies policies and 
procedures. Prior to the Farrell litigation, there were inconsistent and uneven 
practices between the facilities and within living units at the same facility.62 Staff 
were legitimately confused as to what would be expected of them in a multitude 
of areas.63 For a major state bureaucracy, it was unusual that the DJJ ran so 
informally, with little documentation or accountability. When problems would 
arise, staff were uncertain if they would be blamed for untoward outcomes. DJJ 
managers and direct-care staff became increasingly “risk averse” and thus limited 
the nature and extent of youth opportunities that could be put in place. Youth 
interpreted the lack of consistency by staff as prejudice or bias, and they 
perceived staff reluctance to try new activities as indicative of a general lack of 
regard for their well-being. If there were rules, no one seemed to know what they 
were. 
In all, the DJJ developed or refreshed nearly 800 operational policies and 
procedures. Rewriting policies encouraged different disciplines to work together 
and facility managers to weigh in on particularizing the agency-wide policies for 
their facilities. The revised policies were closely vetted by the court experts and 
 
61. See Sixth Report of the Special Master, attachment 1, at 4, Farrell v. Tilton, No. RG 03079344 (Cal. 
Super. Ct., Alameda Cnty. Dec. 2007), available at https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/publications/ 
farrell_v_tilton_ca_cya_djj_6th_sm_report_mental_health_2008.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
62. Id.  
63. See, e.g., Sixth Report of the Special Master, app. A, at 2, Farrell v. Tilton, No. RG 03079344 (Cal. 
Super. Ct., Alameda Cnty. Dec. 2007), available at https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/publications/ 
farrell_v_tilton_ca_cya_djj_6th_sm_report_mental_health_2008.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
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the plaintiffs’ counsel.64 The updated policies were designed to be consistent with 
federal and state legal requirements, and the policy teams looked to best practices 
identified in the juvenile justice literature. The DJJ policy development team 
surveyed several other states for advice and copies of existing policies.65 Union 
representatives were included in these discussions through a “meet and confer” 
process, but did not possess veto power on the central elements of the policies. 
Once the policies were approved by top DJJ management, the agency mapped 
out a deliberate strategy to train all of those who needed to understand and 
implement the new policies.66 In a sense, this process led to a fundamental 
reinvention of the DJJ that was consistent with its new mission to be a place of 
high quality evidence-based services for troubled youth. 
B. Expanding and Enhancing Treatment and Rehabilitation Services 
The transitions at the DJJ are all examples of the efforts to counteract or 
eliminate ineffective and harmful methods to influence youth behavior. However, 
of equal importance were major strides forward towards enhancing the positive 
interventions with DJJ youngsters. There have been substantial upgrades in the 
quality and quantity of resources devoted to health care, mental health services, 
support of youth with disabilities, and educational and special education 
programming. As part of the Farrell consent decree, the DJJ committed to 
constructing and implementing a model treatment program. While this objective 
was very ambitious, and very few states offer good prototypes of model 
treatment systems, the DJJ made an unequivocal commitment to offering high-
quality, evidence-based rehabilitation services in a planned and systematic 
manner. 
DJJ managers visited other juvenile corrections systems in Washington, 
Colorado, and Missouri to learn from the treatment approaches in these 
jurisdictions. The decision was made to develop an Integrated Behavior 
Treatment Model (IBTM) that was tailored to the unique attributes of youth and 
other localized factors, including the length of stay, the influence of gangs in the 
DJJ, the shared responsibility with counties, and the larger size of California 
 
64. See generally Sixth Report of the Special Master, app. A, attachment 1, Farrell v. Tilton, No. RG 
03079344 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Cnty. Dec. 2007), available at https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/ 
publications/farrell_v_tilton_ca_cya_djj_6th_sm_report_mental_health_2008.pdf (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review) (scrutinizing several new policies implemented by the DJJ). 
65. See JESSE JANNETTA ET AL., UC IRVINE CENTER FOR EVIDENCE-BASED CORRECTIONS, THE ROLE OF 
THE DJJ IN THE CALIFORNIA JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (2007). 
66. See Major Cases and Achievements, PRISON LAW OFFICE (2015), available at http://www.prisonlaw. 
com/cases.php (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
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facilities.67 The court experts worked closely with DJJ managers, as well as 
consultants from Orbis Associates, faculty at the University of California 
campuses at Davis and Irvine, and the University of Cincinnati, to build the 
IBTM.68 Representatives of the Prison Law Office were intimately involved in 
the review and definition of the new IBTM. 
The first important element of the IBTM was to implement a validated risk 
and needs assessment system to inform case plans. Next, DJJ staff needed to 
develop a comprehensive case management process and train those staff who 
would fulfill this function. The case planning process would logically lead to DJJ 
youngsters being assigned to evidence-based interventions, both group sessions 
and one-on-one counseling. The IBTM envisioned that case plans would be 
updated at regular intervals and would help support subsequent reentry planning. 
Another critical element of the IBTM were clear policies to respond to youth 
conduct, with both appropriate negative sanctions and a system of positive 
incentives or rewards for youth who were actively participating in rehabilitation 
and educational programming. The older behavior management system was “all 
sticks and few carrots.” Staff needed to embrace a different viewpoint that valued 
positive reinforcements for youth rather than the routine reliance on punishment 
and deprivation of basic services. The new theory of the IBTM envisioned youth 
going through a series of stages as they progressed towards returning to their 
communities. Staff at several facilities started up incentive programs that 
encouraged young people to strive for pro-social behavior and attitudes. 
The IBTM was a giant step forward for the DJJ, which had not stayed current 
with the latest research and evidence on what worked to reform chronic and 
violent youthful offenders. However, it was not enough to just have a set of 
written policies that articulated the goals and objectives of the IBTM. It was 
imperative that the leadership of the DJJ, the facility superintendents, the middle 
managers, and direct-care staff understand and embrace the new approach. High 
quality training was required for all staff in many areas that were essential to the 
success of the IBTM. Further, the IBTM needed clear metrics so that managers 
and the Farrell and internal monitors could assess progress of individual youth, 
particular living units, and facilities. Staff buy-in and willingness to try new 
interventions were very important. Cynicism and poor staff morale had to be 
overcome if the new IBTM was to live. 
The evolution of the IBTM was a very difficult and time-consuming struggle 
that surfaced fundamental issues of trust and cooperation among various DJJ 
staff. There were myriads of concrete policy decisions that had to be made after 
 
67. See Ninth Report of the Special Master at 13, Farrell v. Cate, No. RG 03079344, (Cal. Super. Ct., 
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appropriate staff input. For several months the IBTM was more a “paper tiger” 
than a real reform, although that situation changed. The DJJ needed to reevaluate 
staffing needs to make the IBTM a reality and all levels of personnel from youth 
corrections officers, to counselors, mental health professionals, and 
administrative and support personnel needed to prepare for changed job 
descriptions and changing work relationships. More will be said later about the 
strategies employed by the DJJ to move the IBTM from theory to reality and the 
continuing challenges to fully actualizing the IBTM. 
Part of the IBTM was a significant upgrading of the treatment services 
available to youngsters. In the past, a very large number of rehabilitation 
programs would be started and ended without a thorough analysis of whether 
these efforts were successful.69 Individual staff would start up groups and 
introduce treatment curriculum, but these were delivered on an erratic basis. 
Programs were often responsive to various fads like “tough love,” “the inner 
wounded child,” “scared straight,” and “correctional boot camps” or to outside 
vendors who sought to sell curriculum materials to the DJJ.70 There were many 
discrete programs tried but no evidence that any one of these interventions had 
the proper “dosage” to produce positive outcomes. No one seemed interested in 
whether the young people found value in these programs. Too often, “treatment” 
meant sitting in your room for hours and filling out a workbook that might be 
looked at some point by staff. 
One of the most significant positive reforms was that the DJJ chose to 
implement a limited set of interventions that possessed very strong research 
support.71 Moreover, the unproven efforts were gradually phased out. 
Consultants, especially from the University of Cincinnati, helped DJJ staff focus 
on fidelity to the details of the treatment models.72 A process of ongoing 
assessment of the selected treatment programs was instituted. Most importantly, 
treatment became more interactive and allowed for greater communication and 
connections among DJJ young people and staff. 
Another area of very encouraging reform was improvement of DJJ processes 
to protect youth rights. Placing great value on fairness in dealing with youth was 
 
69. See MARK W. LIPSEY, CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUST. REFORM, IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
JUVENILE JUSTICE PROGRAMS 7 (Dec. 2010), available at http://cjjr.georgetown.edu/pdfs/ebp/ebppaper.pdf (on 
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72. See Program Design, UNIV. OF CINCINNATI CORR. INST. (2014), http://www.uc.edu/corrections/ 
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a vital part of the Farrell consent agreement.73 Upgrading protections for youth 
was very important to the overall treatment mission and caused a fundamental 
shift in staff culture. 
DJJ rewrote the Youth Rights Manual and paid special attention to the needs 
of youngsters with disabilities. Eventually the DJJ labored to make sure that the 
written products were “user friendly” and available to the youngsters on their 
living units. Another major area of improvement was a refinement and 
clarification of the due process afforded to youth at disciplinary hearings and in 
determinations about program alterations, especially the process that assigned 
youth to BTPs and other limited programming units. DJJ also developed clear 
and consistent criteria and a thoughtful process to decide whether youngsters 
committing very serious infractions should be subject to criminal charges.74 
At the beginning of the Farrell case, the grievance and complaint process for 
youth was completely dysfunctional. In the 1970s, California was recognized as a 
national leader in advancing appropriate youth rights.75 Federal legislation such 
as the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) was strongly 
influenced by many policies and practices of the California Youth Authority.76 
The DJJ revamped the entire grievance process and retrained staff in new 
procedures. There were also several external and internal audits of the grievance 
system that led to further refinements. Over time, the number of youth grievances 
declined precipitously and the remaining youth complaints were handled in a 
timely manner. Problems of staff manipulation of the grievance process were 
curtailed, and youth and staff were encouraged to resolve minor issues on an 
informal basis so as to build more trust between them. 
Prominently displayed in every living unit was basic information about the 
grievance process, access to the ombudsperson, opportunities for religious 
services, and timely access to health care. DJJ eventually agreed to provide more 
opportunities for its youth to regularly confer with lawyers and community youth 
advocates. Youngsters were given briefings about the impact of federal laws such 
as the Americans with Disability Act (ADA), the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA), and the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA).77 The 
youth were also informed about the requirements of the Farrell consent decree.78 
 
73. See Consent Decree, supra note 13, at 5–10 (discussing the steps taken to ensure fairness in dealings 
with youth in the juvenile justice system). 
74. See KRISBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 5. 
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78. See id. (listing the right to a comprehensive orientation detailing all legal rights of youth, which 
includes the rights detailed in the Farrell Consent Decree). 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 46 
793 
Staff also received this training and they were sensitized to the renewed and 
enhanced DJJ focus of fairness and consistency in its dealing with youngsters and 
with their families. Discussions of these issues were often integrated into the 
large groups held in the living units each morning. Not surprisingly, some staff 
objected to the heightened attention to youth rights, but their opposition 
diminished over time. The role of top leadership in explicitly supporting the 
renewed direction on youth rights was crucial. 
The Farrell consent decree placed a strong emphasis on involving families in 
the care and rehabilitation of DJJ youth. Support for this idea had been 
traditionally limited among DJJ managers and staff, although there were some 
superintendents who pushed this concept. Many staff assumed that the youth 
suffered from the abuse and criminal activities of their parents and guardians, so 
greater involvement with “negative” adults made no sense them.79 
Over time, with training and coaching, this anti-family bias was greatly 
diminished. Each facility assigned a person to be the family involvement 
coordinator, the number of visiting hours was expanded, and visiting times were 
lengthened. The DJJ even experimented with video conferencing to help youth 
keep in contact with parents and guardians who lived very far from the 
institutions. Each facility began organizing family days for those youth who were 
doing the best in their education and programming. The family days often 
involved special activities that allowed the youth and their families to enjoy more 
normalized interactions. The visiting rooms were redecorated to minimize the 
jail-like atmosphere of the institutions and create a welcoming environment. Staff 
were asked to attend the family days so that they could give the parents an update 
on how their children were progressing. The DJJ tracked the visiting process and 
tried to remove barriers to youngsters who wanted to connect with their families. 
The DJJ has made impressive progress in implementing a new reentry 
process for its youth. The best research makes clear that quality reentry planning 
and support are closely linked to reducing recidivism.80 Historically, the DJJ had 
a parole division that was responsible for youth who exited its facilities.81 In 
2010, the Legislature eliminated parole services within the DJJ and transferred 
this responsibility to the counties.82 Under SB 1628, the DJJ discharges youth 
back to the county of commitment.83 While the state gives localities some funding 
 
79. See CHRISOTPHER MURRAY ET AL., supra note 48, at 62 (discussing the importance of family 
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for the aftercare function, it is less than was previously allocated to DJJ parole, 
and counties were given little or no direction on how to best organize aftercare 
programs. There were numerous reports of prior DJJ youngsters who were 
homeless, unemployed, or drifting without assistance. Former DJJ young people 
who needed medical care, especially medication, found these services difficult to 
obtain. 
Staff with the DJJ decided to “step into the gap” by designing an internally 
delivered reentry and aftercare program, led by a designated reentry specialist at 
each DJJ facility. The protocol for this program is very detailed and 
comprehensive. 
The reentry specialists help youth prepare for their hearing before the 
Juvenile Parole Board and even invite  Parole Board members to hold seminars 
for youth on the release process. Each youth develops an individual aftercare 
plan with the assistance of the reentry specialist and this plan actively involves 
the youth’s family members when possible.84 The plan includes goals in the 
sectors of housing, education, and employment, as well as helps the youth 
identify local resources to continue work on personal issues after release.85 
Aftercare preparation also includes helping the youngsters obtain a valid driver’s 
license or ID, registering the young person to vote, and signing them up for 
Social Security, state disability and unemployment benefits, and the Covered 
California health program.86 
The reentry specialist works with the youth to help them clear up outstanding 
legal challenges such as warrants, unpaid victim restitution or court costs, and 
ICE holds. Where possible, the DJJ aftercare planning and actions are 
coordinated with county probation officials where the youth will eventually 
reside. 
This aftercare work is very labor intensive and demands that the reentry 
specialists are committed to “go the extra mile” to make in-person or phone 
contacts and to smooth the transition process as much as possible. The youth 
report that they greatly value these services and the net public benefits should be 
realized in terms of fewer young people being rearrested or incarcerated in the 
future. 
V. THE UNFINISHED REFORM AGENDA 
Reforming the DJJ is very much a “work in progress.” Many of the excellent 
changes discussed above are not finished but are clearly headed in the right 
direction. More importantly, it is clear that virtually all of the top leadership, 
 
84. See id.  
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middle managers, and a majority of the direct-line staff have embraced this new 
direction for the DJJ. 
The current DJJ staff that I interviewed said that they now realized that the 
reform process would never be completed. They reported that the agency was 
committed to a constant process of learning about the latest research and best 
practices, attempting to implement those new ideas, and measuring the results. 
Ongoing and expanded staff training was seen as a key agenda item for the 
future. 
Other of my interviewees suggested that more progress needed to be 
achieved in reducing the negative influence of gangs in the DJJ. The DJJ is still 
in the very nascent stages of a revamped gang intervention model. There has 
been affirmative progress to improve mental health services but there was broad 
agreement that more progress was needed. 
Several of those interviewed raised concerns about the old and crumbling 
facilities that were not designed to create a very effective treatment milieu. The 
“useful life” of the older places such as OHCYCF and VYCF was judged to be 
not very much longer. Few in the DJJ felt that there would be additional 
investments in the facilities by the Governor or the Legislature. The best guess is 
that the worst problems in DJJ infrastructure be repaired and efforts will be made 
to humanize the current facilities. It was hoped that future elected officials would 
tackle the replacement of DJJ institutions. Many of those interviewed called for 
reducing the size of the living units even further than the Farrell limits and 
further enhancing the ratio of treatment staff to youth. 
The OSM and court experts pointed to further reforms needed in the 
implementation of the IBTM. Training in all of the core ingredients of the IBTM 
still required a more diversified and intensive outreach to staff. In particular, it 
was noted that there was a need for the top managers to more fully understand 
the IBTM. There was support for the IBTM in theory, but it was felt that top 
leadership needed to increase their knowledge and ability to train and mentor 
others. 
Some of the weakest links in the IBTM implementation process were needed 
improvements and simplification of the needs assessment process and 
improvements in staff ability to deliver high quality cognitive behavioral training 
and anger management groups. 
A new substance abuse program was piloted from December 2012 to May 
2013.87 In September 2013, the DJJ conducted training for trainers with staff who 
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completed the pilot. The substance program was implemented statewide in 
December 2013, with the first cycle completed in June 2014.88 
Staff need more training in the operational details of the case management 
and better tracking of treatment resources for individual youth. Several of those 
that I interviewed stressed the need for a better integration within the IBTM of 
counselors, educators, and mental health staff. The incentive process and the 
reinforcement system have really just been launched and there is need for more 
practicing and adjustments of this core component of the IBTM. Some DJJ staff 
urged that there should be more opportunities created for youth to play positive 
leadership roles in a wide range of DJJ programs and services. 
DJJ is making admirable steps forward to reintroduce reentry services and to 
better prepare youth for successful return home. Reentry services must begin 
earlier in the DJJ process and be tightly connected to the IBTM. Some of my 
interviewees suggested that the length of stay in DJJ should be shortened further 
and that there is need for less secure housing options for those youngsters 
approaching release. 
The OSM, the plaintiffs’ lawyers, and most of the court experts believe that 
the DJJ should further restrict and, perhaps, eliminate the use of chemical 
restraints—at least for the mentally ill youth or in single-youth incidents that 
presented no imminent threats to the life and safety of youth and staff.89 
The youth advocates called for better access of the DJJ residents to legal 
advisors on a range of topics.90 They also called for continued improvements in 
the grievance process and the ability of young people to get their concerns heard 
and acted upon.91 
Moreover, most of the interviewees were concerned about sustaining the 
progress made in the DJJ into the future. There were worries that future statewide 
elected officials would abandon the reforms based on public fears about youth 
crime and violence: What if youth arrests started to increase? It was also 
expressed that future state budget problems might put closing down the DJJ back 
on the table. These DJJ close observers stressed the need for current leadership to 
aggressively broadcast the “good news story” about the DJJ changes. 
Most of those that I spoke with urged that there be stronger coalitions 
established with county juvenile and criminal justice officials, who should be 
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very invested in the continuation of a successful state juvenile corrections 
agency. It was recommended that the DJJ could offer training and technical 
assistance to counties in effective policies and practices to treat and educate the 
most troubled young people. The media and civic groups should be cultivated as 
powerful allies of the DJJ. The research community should be encouraged to 
evaluate the effects of various aspects of the DJJ. 
A different aspect of sustaining the reforms is to cultivate the next generation 
of DJJ leadership. Due to state personnel rules, many current DJJ leaders will 
retire in the next five years or less. The DJJ needs to design and implement a 
process to identify the potential future facility and statewide leaders. There 
should be high quality training for this next generation of leaders in the latest 
research and also the best methods to institute and maintain progressive reforms. 
University-based programs in public policy and management should be asked to 
assist in this endeavor. 
VI. HOW THE DRAMATIC DJJ REFORMS WERE ACHIEVED? 
“I get by with a little help from my friends.” 
Moving from the fairly objective recounting of what occurred, we redirect 
the narrative to the more subjective and judgmental analysis to identify what led 
to the successful transformation of the DJJ. Reasonable and knowledgeable 
observers are likely to disagree about the right ingredients of the “reform stew.” 
Interestingly, there was, in fact, remarkable consensus among the diverse 
interviewees that I polled as to what helped DJJ move from being one of the 
worst juvenile corrections agencies to one of the better ones. 
The push for major change in the DJJ came initially from a dedicated group 
of youth advocates who raised grave concerns about the decline of the California 
youth corrections system in the 1990s and the early years of the 21st Century.92 
This group included organizations such as Books Not Bars, the Haywood Burns 
Institute, the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, the Commonweal Institute, 
the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, the National Youth Law 
Center, the Youth Law Center, and the Youth Justice Institute. Relying on 
research and policy viewpoints from federal agencies and other states, these 
advocates documented the deterioration of DJJ programs and services. Their 
vocal critiques of the DJJ convinced many in the media and, more importantly in 
the Legislature, that urgent actions were required.93 
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The calls for reform were mostly ignored by the DJJ and the state youth 
agency hunkered down to defend its tenuous status quo. The proponents of 
reform pointed to very high rates of recidivism, the growing length of stay of DJJ 
youngsters that exceeded that of any other state, serious crowding, reports of high 
levels of institutional violence, and the escalating costs of operating the state 
facilities.94 Because the advocates were given very limited access to DJJ facilities 
or data, they often relied on stories that were told by former residents and staff of 
the state juvenile facilities. 
In 2000, the newly established Office of the Inspector General (OIG) 
conducted a series of investigations of the DJJ in the wake of a series of suicides 
and riots at several facilities.95 The OIG pointed to problems of rampant gang 
violence in the facilities, the prevalence of drugs and other contraband in the 
facilities, frequent use of solitary confinement, and excessive UOF that bordered 
on torture of some DJJ youth.96 The OIG noted evidence of the breakdowns in 
health care, mental health, and education services. These OIG reports received 
little immediate action by Governor Gray Davis, but he did appoint new 
leadership for DJJ.97 
The Legislature, under the guidance of Senator Gloria Romero, held a series 
of high profile hearings based on the OIG reports.98 The U.S. DOJ Special 
Litigation Unit conducted a special inquiry into the treatment of youth at 
NACYCF.99 
Simultaneously, the Youth Law Center filed successful lawsuits challenging 
the absence of adequate on-site health care services and major deficiencies in 
special education and DJJ school programs.100 While these cases took years to 
resolve, the litigation opened up the agency to levels of outside scrutiny that were 
not previously possible. In 2003 the Prison Law Office (PLO) filed a 
comprehensive lawsuit covering virtually all aspects of the DJJ.101 The PLO had 
achieved great success in its challenges to the conditions of confinement in the 
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state prisons and enjoyed strong credibility in the Governor’s office and the 
Attorney General’s office. The litigation was settled and the parties negotiated a 
detailed set of remedial plans and the Court appointed a Special Master and 
Court Experts to monitor the remedial agreements. Most of those interviewed for 
this paper asserted that the lawsuit was a necessary, but not sufficient, force for 
reform. These interviewees felt that meaningful reforms would have taken 
decades to achieve without the lawsuit. Further, the lawyers at the PLO were 
genuinely improving the lives of young people in the DJJ. They could navigate 
the delicate and complex role of lawyers for troubled youth—what national youth 
law expert Mark Soler referred to as being both “warriors and healers.” The PLO 
was firm in its focus on implementing the Farrell orders, but it evidenced great 
flexibility and the ability to collaborate and compromise. PLO attorneys Donald 
Specter and Sara Norman were “hands on” reformers who got to know and 
appreciate the staff and youth in the DJJ. 
The Farrell consent decree allowed the DJJ to request substantial additional 
funds from the Legislature at a time of overall state budget austerity. The consent 
decree established a clear structure that defined the outcomes to be achieved and 
timetables for progress. Moreover, the lawsuit resulted in a mechanism of outside 
accountability that included the judge, who played a very active role in the case, 
the plaintiffs’ attorneys, the Special Master, and the court experts. These 
individuals conducted regular monitoring site visits to all DJJ facilities, 
assembled massive amounts of information about DJJ operations, and generated 
public reports on the evolving conditions of the state juvenile facilities. 
For its part, the DJJ needed to create an internal cadre of managers who 
would track the reforms and generate internal and external assessments of 
progress. Attorneys for the parties, the OSM, and the court experts conferred on a 
weekly basis and there were settlement compliance conferences before the judge 
on a quarterly basis. These byproducts of the Farrell case created a new level of 
transparency and accountability that supported the change process. Reports 
authored by the OSM and the court experts, as well as court hearings, were open 
to the public and generated additional media coverage about the conditions in the 
DJJ and the challenges faced by its youthful residents.102 
The lawsuit also offered state officials political cover as they liberalized and 
humanized the conditions and programs within the DJJ. The more conventional 
“tough on crime” voices were still powerful in the DJJ, the media, and the 
Legislature. However, the Farrell consent decree allowed the DJJ leadership to 
argue that they had no choice in the matter. While the initial reforms may have 
been based on the lawsuit, the current leadership and staff have shifted the 
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perspective towards viewing these changes as the right thing to do to achieve 
better outcomes and to reduce recidivism for DJJ’s youth. 
The Farrell consent decree introduced a set of nationally respected outsiders, 
including the OSM and the court experts, who offered their experience and 
knowledge of the latest research and professional opinions.103 Most importantly, 
the DJJ did not have to search for a new mission and vision; the Farrell consent 
decree provided the basic framework for the organization. The challenge for the 
DJJ was to embrace that new philosophy at all levels of the organization and to 
give it life. 
The Legislature and the Governor also played a major role in the DJJ reforms 
beyond providing additional funds. There were several major laws enacted that 
dramatically reduced the DJJ population and ended severe crowding.104 These 
legislative actions diverted large numbers of youth, especially non-violent 
property and drug offenders, and parole violators, to local programs and 
mandated the early discharge of some DJJ youth who had previously served their 
entire statutory time in DJJ facilities. Other new laws reduced the use of “time 
adds” by staff as punishment for youth and curbed some of the most arbitrary 
decisions by the Juvenile Parole Board.105 The upper range to which youth could 
be housed in DJJ was reduced from twenty-five to twenty-three years of age.106 
Moreover, the Legislature granted substantial funding to counties to manage 
youth who were formerly sentenced to the DJJ.107 The most current research in 
the field of juvenile justice suggested that a smaller and better resourced DJJ 
would be less violence-prone and produce better outcomes for youth.108 
A. The Role of Leadership of DJJ 
The CYA had been fortunate from its very creation of having outstanding 
leadership. In particular, the former head of California’s juvenile corrections 
agency, Allen Breed, was regarded as an internationally celebrated expert on 
enlightened and progressive juvenile justice and corrections policy.109 But after 
Allen Breed was appointed by President Jimmy Carter to run the National 
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Institute of Corrections, the leadership situation at CYA was never quite the 
same. 
From 1980 to 2014, there had been almost twenty formally appointed 
directors or temporary heads of DJJ.110 Only a few of them had come up through 
the CYA agency structure and possessed even basic preparation for the job. The 
majority of those who joined the parade of DJJ leaders had backgrounds in 
policing and adult corrections. They were often outsiders who had to win support 
within the agency to accomplish their agendas. Few of them stayed around long 
enough to establish a sustained leadership style and direction. Most of the staff 
who observed this revolving door of directors assumed that more changes were 
soon likely to occur and there was a reluctance to become too closely attached to 
the current office holder. The ever-changing directorship reduced the clout and 
credibility of the DJJ director in the Department of Finance, the Legislature, and 
the broader juvenile justice professional world. 
In 2010, CDCR Secretary Matthew Cate asked Michael Minor to assume the 
leadership of DJJ. Minor had already completed a long career and was eligible to 
retire. Director Minor had been promoted through various jobs as a Youth 
Corrections Officer and Youth Corrections Counselor and was Chief of Security 
at NACYCF during one of its most troubled periods.111 He also was assigned to 
be the superintendent at several DJJ facilities, often after major problems had 
overwhelmed others in leadership positions at those places. Immediately before 
being named Director of DJJ, Minor was in charge of all of the DJJ facilities in 
Northern California. 
At the time of his interview with Secretary Cate, Michael Minor made clear 
that he did not want to take on the assignment to shut down the DJJ. He shared 
with the Secretary his support for the basic direction of the Farrell consent 
decree and that CDCR maintain the organization. Director Minor was assured 
that the goal was to make the DJJ a treatment model to be proud of, as well as 
working to close the lawsuit. At the end of a distinguished career in corrections, 
Minor said that he would rather “go fishing” than preside over a failed agency. 
He convinced staff that “on his watch” there would be no more facility closures 
and massive staff layoffs, factors that had created a sense of hopelessness among 
staff and fear of future uncertainty for DJJ youngsters. 
While there are volumes written about the attributes of leadership in the 
public and private sector, there are a few major factors that are reiterated in these 
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academic treatises.112 Great leaders are not just good managers—they possess a 
vision of where they want to take the enterprise. Second, leaders inspire trust and 
confidence in those around them and they can clearly articulate their vision. 
Leaders are persuasive and can recruit others to their cause. Leaders know how to 
delegate authority and hold others accountable. In the words of President Ronald 
Reagan, they understand the dual principles of “trust but verify.”113 
Leaders are agile learners who quickly absorb and evaluate new information. 
True leaders understand that organizational success is not the product of the 
“great leader” but must be shared and celebrated with many employees. Most of 
all, leaders are persistent and possess patience. They understand that fundamental 
organizational transformations take time to realize and to be sustained. Great 
leaders take their work very seriously but are humble and can listen to criticism 
and disagreements without rancor. They are honest brokers who know how to 
achieve effective compromises among people who must work together to 
succeed. 
Michael Minor possessed a natural instinct for almost all these traits of a 
great leader. He had honed these leadership skills in a career at the CYA and the 
DJJ. Moreover, he adapted his hands-on knowledge of the youngsters in the DJJ 
and its staff to forge his own responses to the implementation of the Farrell 
consent decree. He was a respected and experienced administrator who was 
immediately present at all of the DJJ facilities to meet with youth and employees 
to listen to their fears, concerns, and hopes for the future. 
The Court, the OSM, and the court experts applauded the selection of Minor 
as the DJJ’s director. They respected his intelligence, sincerity, and willingness 
to absorb new ideas. He was not wedded to the “way that we have always done 
things” mentality that had hamstrung the DJJ for several years after the Farrell 
remedial plans were approved by the Court. Minor was an excellent and skillful 
communicator who quickly established his bona fides in the Governor’s office, 
the Legislature, and among important constituency groups. He projected a 
willingness to learn and gave a fair hearing to conflicting views—but he also was 
decisive and firm when critical decisions had to be made. 
Virtually all of my interviewees gave ample credit to Minor for consolidating 
past successes and accelerating momentum going forward. Some of his 
management colleagues were careful not to diminish past DJJ leaders, but they 
were very clear that Minor made a big difference in the pace and intensity of the 
remedial plans. 
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B. Other Strategies for Making the Farrell Remedial Plans a Reality 
Central to Minor’s leadership style was his ability to identify top managers 
from within the organization and permit them to translate the broad contours of 
reform into the discrete operational details of the facilities. Directors of the DJJ 
in the recent past had relied heavily on outside consultants and their colleagues 
from other states. Michael Minor focused his trust on small cadre of experienced 
insider staff that he had known over the years. These strategic-staff middle 
managers brought with them detailed knowledge of how the DJJ functioned on a 
daily operational basis. These management allies were generally supportive of 
the new reform direction, but could also politely confront the OSM and court 
experts if they believed that some of the new concepts were unworkable. Many 
of this core team had begun their careers at the DJJ as direct-care workers, 
counselors, or corrections officers. They were skillful at convincing the 
remaining direct-care workers that the changed policies and practices would 
neither endanger the youth or their co-workers, and they were excellent at 
translating the general road map of the consent decree to specific implementation 
activities and systems. The DJJ is a para-military structured bureaucracy and 
does best when the details are specified in advance and staff can rely on clearly 
defined processes and channels of authority to accomplish their tasks. 
The new management staff created a strong sense of continuity and 
credibility of the reform agenda with the agency’s past. They were trusted by 
fellow staff and could leverage longstanding positive work relationships to enlist 
others in their mission. They understood the daily challenges faced by the front-
line staff and could also anticipate problems. It was very helpful to have a core 
group of top staff that possessed extensive experience in basic details such as 
budget development, procurement of needed services, hiring, union requirements, 
and personnel rules. 
Virtually all of my interviewees from within the DJJ placed great value on 
the expertise and skill of this new management team. This group was credited 
with accelerating the pace of reform and winning over other DJJ staff to the 
changes. This group was the central strategy by which DJJ top managers 
achieved widespread buy-in with the Farrell reforms, and they were instrumental 
in modeling the new DJJ culture. 
While sometimes teamed up with the OSM, the court experts and a limited 
number of outsiders, such as the group from the University of Cincinnati, the 
inner management group provided most of the training of other staff in the new 
methods. They became versed in the central elements of the IBTM and provided 
strategic coaching to others. Director Minor relied on this group to develop 
measures of the success of various reform components and this group worked 
alongside the court experts and OSM to audit the Farrell mandates. 
The management team described above led pivotal reform components, such 
as revising the UOF process, minimizing the use of limited programs, 
2014 / Reforming the Division of Juvenile Justice 
804 
establishing new “business rules” governing staffing patterns, and substantially 
recreating the DJJ approach to gang behavior in its facilities. These managers 
made frequent onsite visits to facilities to confer with the local management staff 
and gauge the obstacles to achieving the Farrell remedial plans. These 
headquarters staff would work together with the facility staff to design 
“corrective action plans” to advance the reforms in instances in which there were 
major issues standing in the way. 
Other essential people in the reform process were the facility superintendents 
and local top managers. The uneven success of the Farrell remedial plans at 
different DJJ facilities was directly related to the knowledge and skill of the local 
leaders to translate the plans into daily activities. The facilities at the OHCYCF 
and NACYCF emerged as the leading edge of the reforms; the VYCF 
experienced great difficulties in managing change. Leadership at the northern 
facility complex had all worked together in very collaborative and positive 
manners with each other and with the new headquarters team. At the VYCF, 
several of the superintendents were replaced after laudable efforts by 
headquarters to improve their performance. Managers at the VYCF expressed 
strong verbal support for the headquarters policy directives, but compliance was 
often superficial or token. The level of trust between the southern facility 
complex and DJJ headquarters had been problematic for years. 
Minor and his team began to spend substantial time at the VYCF. They 
participated in training, mentoring, and auditing the operations there. The short 
travel distance from Sacramento to Stockton made interaction with managers at 
the OHCYCF and the NACYCF relatively easy; whereas being present at the 
VYCF meant flying down to the Los Angeles area and often staying there for 
several days. Early attempts by headquarters to stay connected to the managers at 
the VYCF relied on emails and voice and video conferencing. These methods 
proved of only limited value. In recent months, Director Minor replaced the 
superintendent at the VYCF with a member of his close-in management team. 
Other members of that team continue to work at VYCF on a regular basis. This 
enhanced effort at better direct communication and joint problem-solving 
between headquarters and facility staff has produced substantial progress in 
meeting benchmarks of the Farrell remedial plans, especially in the areas of 
reducing UOF, eliminating the use of solitary confinement, and reducing room 
confinement. The OSM and the court experts have also devoted a substantial 
amount of hours to auditing and increasing the level of fidelity with the core 
elements of the IBTM at VYCF. 
There are two additional strategies that were mentioned by the persons that I 
interviewed. First, the DJJ utilized the approach of pilot testing some of the 
large-scale reforms before rolling these out statewide. The use of testing and 
refinements was especially important for the more complex changes required in 
the areas of the Sex Offender Behavior Treatment Program, the IBTM, and 
improvements in the education and mental care sectors. 
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Earlier DJJ administrators were determined to implement large scale changes 
at every facility simultaneously. They felt that it was problematic to continue the 
old practices with a large segment of the youth population. Further, there was 
perceived pressure to show results in light of the substantial budget 
enhancements given to the DJJ. It was all possible that the rapid implementation 
of Farrell reforms would blunt the ongoing calls among youth advocates to close 
down the entire youth corrections system. 
This aggressive approach to reform was not very successful. Instead, the DJJ 
employed a tactic of piloting some of the largest innovations—first in a single 
living unit, next in a series of other living units, and eventually moving to a 
second facility. The pilots were begun at the OHCYCF, which was judged to be 
most in tune in the philosophy of the Farrell reforms and where there had been a 
tradition of strong local management. 
The pilot approach had major advantages. Primarily, it permitted the DJJ to 
experiment with different methods and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of 
various aspects of the program and policy design. The pilot approach created a 
group of staff who had actually lived with the new program and could be used as 
effective trainers of other staff. Piloting allowed for rapid modifications in the 
policies and procedures being tested on a small scale. Moreover, the piloting 
strategy allowed the DJJ to move forward without having to be completely 
blocked by existing union work rules and agreements. While the pilot testing 
approach may have slowed the initial realization of some of the Farrell reforms, 
this strategy made the expansion of the reforms go more smoothly in the near 
term. 
Another strategy that proved very valuable was a decision initiated by the 
OSM and endorsed by the court experts to conduct the auditing of the remedial 
plans within a collaborative framework. The central idea was that the Farrell 
consent decree required that the DJJ take over self-monitoring of the remedial 
plan in the future. The joint audit teams were believed to create opportunities for 
this handoff of responsibilities. 
The joint auditing process was highly structured. Approximately 45 days 
before a scheduled site visit to a facility, the DJJ audit team would provide a 
detailed measurement of all the elements that required monitoring. This report 
would include all of the backup data that were employed by the DJJ team to 
make their conclusions. The court experts had already explained to the DJJ 
auditors the nature of the evidence that was required. 
The OSM and the court expert would review these pre-audit materials and 
request additional information as needed. These pre-audit reports were closely 
scrutinized for areas of partial or non-compliance, as well as for the reasons 
given for less than full compliance. The court expert would sample the data for 
areas deemed to be in full compliance to double check the quality of the internal 
DJJ audits. Over time, the court experts would also examine changes in ratings 
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and the rationale for these changes. The internal auditors, the OSM, and the court 
expert would confer about the pre-audits in advance of the site visits. 
The collaborative audit teams would be on-site for the actual audits. At this 
time, supplemental data was collected and additional interviews were conducted 
with staff and the court expert, and OSM interviewed a significant sample of DJJ 
youngsters and staff. All open living units were visually inspected by the audit 
team. An informal written and oral briefing was given to the facility mangers and 
to headquarters staff shortly after the onsite work was completed. Later, the OSM 
and the court expert filed a formal audit report and received feedback from the 
plaintiffs’ and defendant’s legal representatives, as well as other members of the 
DJJ management team. 
The process produced a very significant level of agreement among the 
agency auditor and the outside Farrell monitors. Most importantly, the joint audit 
process allowed members of the team to learn from each other’s diverse 
experiences and areas of expertise. This solidified the goal of working together to 
successfully meet all of the requirements of the Farrell consent decree. It 
fostered a spirit of candid communication and a sincere effort to consider many 
perspectives within the implementation process. Many great ideas surfaced for 
improving the quality of the audits, and there were agreements that some very 
complex areas, such as improvements in the review of UOF, the grievance 
system, and the care of disabled youth, would demand follow-ups and more in-
depth monitoring. 
In general, the joint teams worked very well together. In some of the highly 
specialized areas involved in the auditing of health care and education issues 
there was a need for the court experts to play a larger role in the initial 
assessments. This process worked well and permitted a very efficient handoff of 
the primary auditing role to the Office of Audits and Court Compliance, with the 
proviso that the parties, the OSM, or the court experts could play a larger role in 
the monitoring process as needed in the future. 
C. Great Ideas Whose Results Were Underwhelming 
Not every reform strategy meets its expected goals, even if those ideas that 
would appear obvious. I asked each of my interviewees to tell me what “great 
ideas” did not pan out or failed to meet their expectations. Sometimes these 
concepts came directly from the consent decree and other times the reform 
activities were promoted by the parties, the OSM, or the court experts. When the 
results were less than expected, the DJJ often revamped its approach in these 
areas. There was remarkable consensus among the people with whom I talked 
about the ineffective change models. 
The interviewees explained that they had all assumed that the massive input 
of staff training on a wide range of pertinent topics would advance the Farrell 
reforms. Indeed the remedial plans specified a tremendous amount of new 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 46 
807 
training for virtually all DJJ staff that was to be delivered very quickly. At the 
beginning of the Farrell case, training was primarily offered by a joint academy 
with CDCR and was almost exclusively focused on security and safety issues. It 
was assumed that training in a range of treatment techniques per se was a key to 
reform. 
Initially the DJJ struggled with the pure logistics of scheduling and 
organizing these training sessions. Training was offered at a central location and 
staff had to adjust work schedules to facilitate the absence of staff that were 
undergoing the training. Further, the quality of the training was, at best, uneven. 
Also, staff were frustrated because they were being prepared for programs and 
systems that did not yet exist and might not be operational for years. Moreover, 
staff promotions, transfers, and retirements meant that many of the staff who had 
these costly educational experiences were no longer functioning in the jobs for 
which they were being prepared. Agency policies and procedures were in flux 
and not entirely consistent with the training being offered. Supervisors were not 
organized to reinforce and model the principles of training in daily activities. 
The training was scattershot without a planned approach to how and when 
the training should be delivered. The DJJ has now moved to establishing a clear 
training plan with realistic timetables. The DJJ is also working to see that the 
training is delivered proximate to the time when new programs and policies are 
introduced. The DJJ is relying less on the joint CDCR academy and is utilizing 
its own internal training staff. Outside substantive consultants are required to use 
a “training for trainers” format so that DJJ staff become more comfortable and 
experienced in the core training areas. Also, the DJJ has learned the need for top 
administrators and mid-level managers to learn the materials before it is 
presented to a larger number of front-line personnel. It is also very beneficial to 
deliver more interdisciplinary training experiences that include education, health, 
and mental health care personnel, along with security staff. The list of areas for 
training has been streamlined and scheduling of various training is more closely 
aligned to the schedule guiding the implementation of the component of the 
remedial plan. The DJJ is revising its training method to be more participatory 
and less didactic. New ways of assessing the achievement of learning objectives 
will include a major focus on demonstrating mastery of the content and skills, not 
just the number of staff who put their names on sign-up sheets. 
Another area of very limited returns for the reforms was the amount of time 
devoted to disagreements over the proper risk and needs assessment system to 
adopt. There were also weeks spent on a lack of consensus, including the exact 
treatment curriculum to use as part of the IBTM. Initially, the DJJ relied on 
outside consultants and a small group of managers to specify its version of the 
IBTM. Several of the court experts felt left out of this process and felt that the 
choices made by the DJJ leadership were not the best ones. After months of work 
by the DJJ and its consultants, there was only the skimpiest written description of 
the IBTM. 
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The court experts demanded a fuller, research-based model, together with an 
operations manual and training curriculum for the IBTM. The plaintiffs’ lawyers 
asked for an order for the court experts and the DJJ to deliver the design of the 
IBTM and the related implementation tool. The judge helped negotiate an 
apparent agreement in which the court experts and their staff worked with the 
DJJ to produce the requested IBTM materials. This joint drafting team could 
never reach consensus and months went by with little or no progress seen on the 
IBTM. 
The product of the joint group was very vague and generic in its tone. 
Responding with extreme frustration, the parties and the court returned to the 
original plan that the DJJ would author the IBTM design with input from the 
court experts and the OSM. The lengthy dispute weakened whatever trust may 
have existed among the parties and the court experts and finally led to the 
resignation of the Special Master and two of the court experts. This “era of bad 
feelings and bruised egos” stalled the commencement of the IBTM for almost 
two years. 
In hindsight, this argument over the most proven evidence-based tools and 
curriculum materials seems to have missed the essential spirit of the reforms. The 
differences among competing assessment systems or treatment curriculum were 
relatively small and unlikely to shape the overall direction of the Farrell reforms. 
Moreover, this battle lost sight of the core principle that DJJ managers and staff 
had to comprehend and embrace the reforms. The conflict delayed gaining staff 
buy-in and stymied efforts to improve services for youth. In the end, the IBTM 
model emerged out of a reading of the research literature, the treatment style that 
best fit the DJJ management style, and the considerable adaptation and 
refinement that happened as the IBTM was piloted in real living units with actual 
DJJ young people. 
Another early implementation dilemma was created as the parties negotiated 
about staffing levels and the building of data-based accountability systems before 
it was clear how the reforms would be fully implemented. This decision resulted 
in the creation of large amounts of time devoted to documenting activities and 
youth contacts. Staff complained that they were chained to their computers 
entering information that might never be looked at, rather than increasing the 
amount of time that staff could devote to one-on-one counseling and personal 
interactions with the DJJ youngsters. There were also periods in which many new 
staff were hired without a clear plan on how they would be utilized or how the 
living unit teams would function. This drove up the per-youth costs of the DJJ 
and raised questions as to whether the agency had “priced itself out of the 
market.” As with training, more is not always better. A simple lesson of this 
experience is to not staff up until you are clear about staff job descriptions and 
responsibilities. Moreover, do not construct complex and difficult data collection 
and reporting systems until you have specified the desired outcomes and agreed 
on the appropriate metric for those outcomes. 
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The levels of violence in the DJJ facilities seemed to decline as a direct result 
of the living unit sizes being substantially decreased. Other remedial plan 
components that set up “Violence Reduction Committees” had far less impact on 
youth safety. For a time it appeared that almost every problem in the DJJ was met 
with a special task force at headquarter or new committees at each facility. Over 
time these committees met sporadically and included a number of surrogates for 
the top managers. Staff devoted time to writing up the group deliberations, but 
few important actions or changed practices emanated from the expanding number 
of staff groups. In the end, the DJJ decided to combine and consolidate the work 
of these staff committees. 
While these good faith reform tactics never met their fullest potential, the 
overall achievements at the DJJ were notable. Many of the key ingredients of 
positive change did produce the desired results. In the best of cases, the time that 
it takes to reshape a major state bureaucracy is considerable. But, some of the 
organizational insights discussed by my interviewees might have shortened the 
duration of the reform process. Major organizational reform does take 
considerable patience, focus, and persistent leadership. The very complexity of 
the enterprise and its perilous political context explain why these successes are 
not witnessed very often. 
VII. LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT REFORMING JUVENILE CORRECTIONS SYSTEMS 
IN OTHER STATES 
Besides the very substantial DJJ transformation, there are lessons to be 
gleaned from parallel efforts in four states that were well documented by outside 
researchers. I will briefly review the major findings of those case studies. It is 
worth noting that most of the major findings of the case studies in these states are 
mirrored in the observation and interviews describing the California success 
story. 
A. Closing the Massachusetts Reform Schools and Routinizing the Continuum of 
Care 
The most dramatic reform in the history of juvenile justice was the closure of 
all of Massachusetts state juvenile facilities in the early 1970s.114 There had been 
threats of federal investigation of the abuses in Massachusetts’s reform schools, 
but this was an era before there were major civil rights challenges to juvenile 
corrections. The strategy of change in the Bay State was the rapid closure of all 
the state’s secure facilities and the transfer of youth to a diverse network of 
 
114. JEROME MILLER, LAST ONE OVER THE WALL: THE MASSACHUSETTS EXPERIMENT IN CLOSING 
REFORMS 116, 181 (1998). 
2014 / Reforming the Division of Juvenile Justice 
810 
community-based placements and alternatives.115 This radical strategy was 
adopted after more modest efforts to create therapeutic communities in the 
reform schools were sabotaged by the corrections officer union. The 
Massachusetts Division of Youth Services (DYS) Commissioner Jerome Miller 
surrounded himself with a group of trusted top-level managers who helped plan 
and execute the closures. Miller provided the broad vision and left the operation 
details to his colleagues.116 
Miller was masterful at outreach to the media and to the most powerful 
groups in the state. He enlisted the aid of professors at Harvard Law School, the 
state bar association, influential women’s groups, and the Governor.117 He helped 
the DYS youth tell their personal stories and elicited great sympathy for their 
plight and maltreatment by the corrections officers. He was able to obtain a 
substantial grant from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
(OJJDP) to defray the initial costs of setting up the network of alternatives.118 
The dramatic closure of the reform schools led to a political reaction 
designed to protect the jobs of traditional state employees and avert the closure of 
facilities that were important to the economy of local communities. A new 
Governor asked Miller to resign and many of the reforms were blunted by 
legislative budget decisions and the opposition to reform of many of the judges.119 
Over the next decade, the DYS had a series of Commissioners who carefully 
and deliberately moved the reforms forward. These later leaders of the DYS 
brought with them strong political ties and detailed knowledge of the Legislature, 
the judiciary, and the state budget process. There were also subsequent 
Commissioners with very strong credentials in adult and youth corrections. These 
corrections professionals introduced policies and practices that were consistent 
with progressive thinking in the field, and they played down the political and 
public confrontational style that was Miller’s forte. 
Despite the reaction to the closures, Massachusetts did not reopen the older 
reform schools and the state continued to focus its attention on strengthening the 
community-based system. Research and evaluations supported the promising 
results in the reshaped DYS and national foundations and OJJDP sought to 
replicate the Massachusetts experiment.120 
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B. Creating and Sustaining the Missouri Model 
One of the earliest replications of the Miller vision was in the Missouri 
Division of Youth Services. There had been repeated investigations of child 
abuse of the state’s reform school at Boonville.121 In 1983 the Legislature voted to 
close Boonville and to move to a decentralized system of smaller facilities 
emphasizing therapeutic interventions rather than harsh punishments.122 Youth in 
the Missouri DYS lived in dormitories in facilities that resembled college 
campuses, not jails. Missourians viewed their youthful residents as students and 
citizens, not prison inmates. Over the next several years, the “Missouri Model” 
became the desired template for enlightened juvenile corrections practice. 
A major reason for the sustained success of the Missouri DYS reforms was 
the political skill of its leader, Mark Steward, who built a strong and steadfast 
constituency for reform among the Legislature and the judges. Steward was able 
to articulate the new vision in concepts that appealed both to liberals and 
conservatives in the “Show Me” state. For liberals, the new system offered more 
humane treatment of youth and less incarceration; for conservatives, the system 
appeared to be less costly and emphasized teaching individual accountability to 
the youth. Decentralizing the location of the Missouri DYS facilities created 
economic benefits for the many rural communities that hosted the new programs. 
It is especially notable that the major reinvention of juvenile corrections in 
Missouri survived with little challenge during changing state political leadership 
that spanned the ideological spectrum. 
Noted juvenile corrections authority Richard Mendel has produced the most 
detailed and persuasive description of the Missouri DYS model. 123 Mendel places 
great importance on the decision to downsize the population of the facilities. He 
also notes that the Missouri DYS created a culture dedicated to continuous 
improvements and to engagement with the outside community; the Missouri 
Model depends on a strong and hopeful vision of the potential for youth 
rehabilitation.124 The agency articulated and reinforced an organizational culture 
that rejected punishment as the dominant behavior management tool and replaced 
it with a caring and empathetic approach to its young clients. Mendel believes 
that the Missouri Model requires that there be highly motivated staff that are 
willing to engage the youth whenever and wherever these connections are 
needed.125 The staff are taught not to fear the youth and to seek safety through 
relationships with them, not via coercive practices. Missouri makes preparation 
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for aftercare the central focus of all programs and highlights the necessity of very 
individualized educational and treatment services. Quality case management is 
the lynchpin of the Missouri system. 
C. The Role of Staff in Reforming the New York State Juvenile Corrections 
System 
A somewhat different analysis of the dynamics of juvenile corrections 
change involves the New York State Office of Children and Family Services. 
(OCFS).126 Professor Cox describes in some detail the perceptions of staff to 
juvenile corrections reform.127 She helps us understand how staff might be better 
enlisted to support change efforts. 
In the period beginning in 2007, New York State closed a large number of 
juvenile corrections facilities that were located around the state.128 There were 
several staff layoffs and reductions in facility management personnel. Most of 
these institutions were located in upstate rural communities and their closure 
exerted a big economic impact on this region. 
Some of these closures were responsive to a deep fiscal crisis faced by the 
state and by a trend of declining juvenile arrests and fewer youth being sent to 
OCFS facilities by the courts. The cost of operating the OCFS placements was 
approaching $275,000 per youth on an annual basis. Besides the severe 
budgetary pressures, there were reports of brutal and abusive practices in the 
facilities.129 The U.S. DOJ began an investigation under the auspices of the Civil 
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA).130 This investigation centered on 
five OCFS facilities and the U.S. DOJ demanded changes to stave off federal 
civil rights enforcement.131 The OCFS agreed to a comprehensive agreement to 
remedy the deficiencies and some of the specific facilities were closed. 
The Governor recruited noted child legal rights advocate Gladys Carrion to 
reform the New York State System.132 Ms. Carrion brought in a new management 
team of trusted professionals from other states to manage the closures and to fix 
the inadequate treatment of OCFS youth. 
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There was intense staff opposition to the new management team and claims 
that the program and policy changes had generated a wave of youth violence and 
staff assaults. A video tape of youth attacking staff at one OCFS institution was 
taken by a dismissed employee and broadcast on a local New York City 
television station and the video ultimately went viral on the Internet.133 The 
employee union staged work stoppages to protest against the new management 
team.134 Members of the Legislature and the state Auditor General conducted an 
investigation. The relationship between Commissioner Carrion and the OCFS 
staff remained strained until she left in 2013 to head up New York City’s child 
welfare and juvenile corrections agency. 
Against the background of this intense staff resistance to reform, OCFS was 
still able to meet most of the requirements of its agreement under CRIPA. There 
were many improvements in the quality and quantity of rehabilitative services for 
OCFS youngsters. Other litigation was held off as OCFS made steady progress to 
reduce the UOF, eliminate unnecessary solitary confinement, introduce trauma-
informed therapy for its young people, and upgrade mental health and education 
services. 
Alexandra Cox observed that in New York, as in other locales, the critical 
nature of the work of front-line staff was often overlooked or undervalued.135 The 
front-line staff were often victimized by myths that they lacked basic cultural 
sensitivity with the largely urban population and youth of color who were the 
inmates of the OCFS facilities. In fact, over half of the OCFS direct-care staff 
were African Americans and many came from the same urban communities as 
the OCFS young people. 
Opposition to reform and program closures was explained away by vested 
economic interests due to the loss of wages and fringe benefits. Staff were 
sometimes viewed as too punishment-oriented and unwilling to truly embrace a 
treatment philosophy. Interviews conducted by Cox revealed that staff resistance 
to change was rooted in a sense of being excluded in the planning and design of 
reforms. Changes in policies and procedures were perceived as confusing, ill-
conceived, and subject to nonstop revisions. The staff wanted to be part of 
meaningful discussions about reforms and offer their practical advice on how to 
best effectuate the desired results. 
Uncertainty as to jobs, changing local management assignments, and the 
future existence of these facilities led to a profound sense of being disrespected 
and treated unfairly. These staff felt they were victims of the stereotype that they 
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did not support treatment. Professor Cox found that there was actually a 
significant group of OCFS personnel who wanted to advance treatment goals for 
youth. This group wanted a larger role for reentry and educational services for 
the youth and not just social and emotional therapy. 
Professor Cox noted that staff felt unsafe if they perceived a loss of control. 
As the OCFS changed its policies on UOF, disciplinary practices, and isolation, 
the staff wanted alternatives and tools to better manage disruptive youth behavior 
and defiance of their authority. 
D. Bedlam in Arizona 
The last juvenile corrections case study that I examined was produced as part 
of the tracking of CRIPA reforms undertaken by the Arizona Department of 
Juvenile Corrections (ADJC).136 It revealed a familiar story of abuse and neglect 
of youth that caused condemnation of the agency by outside youth advocacy 
groups and many members of the Legislature. However, a surge in the number of 
suicides by youth and one attempted suicide by a staff member heightened the 
demand for immediate action.137 There were also instances in which staff had 
brutally assaulted one of the youth residents and at least one staff member was 
indicted for having sex with an underage ADJC resident.138 
The U.S. DOJ conducted an investigation under CRIPA.139 Resistance to 
change was strong among the corrections workers and middle managers at 
ADJC. The Governor Janet Napolitano established a special task force to 
examine the causes of the crisis in ADJC and brought in new leadership. 
Many ADJC staff agreed that the CRIPA reforms were needed, but they 
lacked confidence that the agency would be given sufficient resources to 
implement these changes. There was suspicion that the impetus for reform would 
fade as the CRIPA agreement was slowly put into operation. 
As progress to change the organization was too slow, Governor Jan Brewer 
threatened to defund the ADJC and transfer its youth to privately run programs.140 
The combination of strong outside pressure by advocacy groups and the U.S. 
DOJ and the real possibility that the entire system would close down produced 
the impetus to speed up reforms. 
Key to the advanced reform momentum was a forceful and influential new 
Director of ADJC, Michael Branham, who built an internal management team 
devoted to change. Branham had a past career in law enforcement not in juvenile 
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corrections, and some were concerned that his police background would send 
ADJC backwards. But Branham, and his deputy Dianne Gadow, were generally 
credited with changing the culture of the organization to meet the objectives of 
the CRIPA consent decree. Branham instituted data-driven accountability 
systems and created quality assurance processes to sustain the positive changes. 
There were many more checks and balances that ensured that young people in 
ADJC were being accorded the care that they were entitled to by law and 
common morality. Even as Director Branham retired, another leader with a 
strong background in corrections came in and continued Branham’s vision and 
protocols. 
Branham immersed himself in agency operations and spent substantial time 
at the facilities and in the living units. Similar to California DJJ Director Michael 
Minor, Branham put a high value on transparency and shared the results of the 
CRIPA monitoring reports throughout Arizona. The level of compliance with the 
CRIPA agreement rose quickly as ADJC articulated the value of the CRIPA 
reforms to judges, legislators, and the law enforcement community. 
Compliance with the requirements of the CRIPA agreement was not uniform 
in every area. Strides forward were accomplished in discovering and punishing 
misconduct by staff. Educational services improved, but progress in providing 
adequate medical and mental health care lagged behind. 
VIII. REFORMING CALIFORNIA JUVENILE CORRECTIONS: CONCLUDING 
OBSERVATIONS 
There are several policy conclusions that should be drawn from this study 
and analysis. First and foremost, large and constructive improvements can be 
actualized even in the most troubled juvenile corrections systems. These reforms 
do not happen overnight and sustaining new methods of treating youth takes 
patience and a steadfast focus on the goals to be achieved.141 Central to the 
humane care of troubled youth is a fundamental shift in the organizational culture 
away from containment, confrontation, and coercion and towards empathy, basic 
knowledge about adolescent mental and social development, and supportive 
relationships between staff and young people. 
Leadership is essential to promoting and expanding the needed culture shift. 
Staff need to feel valued and included in the change process. Effective leaders 
broadcast their vision and rely on others to flesh out the operational details and 
day-to-day reality of this vision. There must be systems of accountability and 
checks and balances for youngsters and agency personnel. The leader should be 
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committed to transparency and skilled at establishing and nurturing strong allies 
for the reforms, and there must be sufficient resources dedicated to the human 
care of troubled youth. Creating and nurturing an atmosphere of trust among the 
many individuals who will be involved in the reforms is a must. 
Litigation or related civil rights enforcement is a valuable predicate for 
change. Few troubled bureaucracies change spontaneously. However, the legal 
route must be tempered with ultimate attention to improving the care of youth, 
not just court victories. 
Outsiders including Special Masters, court experts, and renowned national 
juvenile justice figures can add great value by exposing the juvenile corrections 
agency to the latest research and best professional opinions. They can also create 
a structure of accountability and standards of performance that are difficult to 
generate internally. 
Change needs to be planned, managed, and monitored closely. There must be 
clear lines of authority and responsibility for reform, and these must be grounded 
in the chain of command. It is unwise to try to fix everything that is broken all at 
once. Pilot testing new policies and programs is a very important strategy. 
Making progress in upgrading the basic care of youth including medical, 
dental, and mental health services can lay the foundation for the culture shift that 
is necessary. The conditions of the living units and the physical plant of 
institutions clearly communicate what value the adults place on the young people 
that they serve. It is often promising to start by upgrading the education program 
because these services are vital to the future success of all of the young people in 
juvenile corrections. 
The preeminent need to develop and assist young people in realistic plans to 
return home is the centerpiece of high quality juvenile corrections programs. 
Youth who can see the way back to the community will be more enthusiastic 
customers of treatment and educational services. 
Lastly, we return to the principle that smaller is better. Living units must be 
made even smaller and the large reform school will likely be a memory in the not 
too distant past. Smaller facilities promote greater safety and permit the sorts of 
positive role modeling and counseling that staff want to offer and that the youth 
desperately need. 
